This paper starts by looking at the coincidence of surprising behavior on the nanolevel in both matter and simulation. It uses this coincidence to argue that the simulation approach opens up a pragmatic mode of understanding oriented toward design rules and based on a new instrumental access to complex models. Calculations, and their variation by means of explorative numerical experimentation and visualization, can give a feeling for a model's behavior and the ability to control phenomena, even if the model itself remains epistemically opaque. Thus, the investigation of simulation in nanoscience provides a good example of how science is adapting to a new instrument: computer simulation.
Introduction
A wide variety of simulations are employed in nanoscience as well as in other branches of science. Let me begin with two examples that illustrate some important properties and problems of simulations-particularly with regard to nanoscience. Both examples stem from Uzi Landman, the director of Georgia Tech's Center for Computational Materials Science. In a landmark Science paper in 1990, Landman and his co-workers reported on the use of large-scale molecular dynamics simulations. They showed that when a nickel tip is brought into close proximity to a sheet of gold, gold atoms jump from the sheet to the probe (Landman et al. 1990 ). into a gold surface. On the following slides, the tip is removed slowly, and a thin wire of gold atoms is generated. Landman's images used artificial coloring to facilitate visualization. Figure 1 is adapted to black-and-white print. Landman describes his own situation as being very similar to that of an experimenter who is watching the outcome of a complicated experimental setup. I quote him from an interview:
To our amazement, we found the gold atoms jumping to contact the nickel probe at short distances. Then we did simulations in which we withdrew the tip after contact and found that a nanometer-sized wire made of gold was created. That gold would deform in this manner amazed us, because gold is not supposed to do this.
This "amazement" is also theoretically amazing, because well-known physical laws at the atomic level served as the basis of the simulation that, in turn, showed unexpected behavior at the nanoscale. The formation of a nanowire was, at that time, a prediction that would be confirmed only some years later by atomic force microscopy.
The second example concerns lubrication and the properties of lubricants that are confined to very small, that is, nanoscaled spaces. Already Feynman had suggested in his famous 1959 lecture that lubrication would have to deal with entirely new phenomena at the nanoscale. Landman has contributed a simulation study revealing one such new phenomenon (2002) . When confined to tight spaces, long-chain lubricant molecules seem to act more like "soft solids" than fluids. The outcome of a numerical experiment in which two surfaces (light-colored, originally yellow) are sliding one against the other is shown in Figure 2 . Lubricant molecules are in the small, nanosized gap between the surfaces as well as in the bulk outside. The upper part of the picture shows a snapshot: The molecules of the lubricant are forming ordered layers that significantly influence the movement of sliding surfaces as friction increases. The molecules confined between the surfaces are colored dark (the coloring of the original visualization on the computer screen is much more vivid). Landman and his colleagues also tried to "overcome the problem" of high friction in their simulation study. When continuing their molecular dynamics simulations, they manipulated the movement of the slides. The simulation shows how oscillating the gap between the two sliding surfaces reduces the order of thin-film lubricant molecules, thus lowering friction. In the lower part of the image, molecules that had been confined within the surface, which were marked red after the first snapshot, have moved out into the bulk lubricant and are no longer confined, and molecules from the bulk areas have moved into the gap (admittedly, this is harder to recognize without colors). These "soft-solid"
properties are unexpected in light of the normal behavior of fluids. Again quoting Landman:
We are accumulating more and more evidence that such confined fluids behave in ways that are very different from bulk ones, and there is no way to extrapolate the behavior from the large scale to the very small. (2001) Many researchers have pointed out that, although the fundamental laws (namely quantum theory) are well known, surprising behavior is a typical observation in the nanoworld. This assertion is one reason why nanoscience currently attracts so much attention and may even be encouraging utopian expectations.
The coincidence of surprising behavior both in matter and in simulation models is the starting point of the present paper. I shall argue that the simulation approach opens up a new mode of scientific understanding based on the deployment of epistemically opaque models whose behavior is made assessable by simulation. Simulation amalgamates control and understanding, providing a kind of "understanding by control" oriented toward design rules and predictions rather than theory-based explanations. Thus, the investigation of simulation in nanoscience reveals how science, and, in particular, the "subjective" concept of understanding, is adapting to a new instrument: computer simulation (see, for a preliminary consideration of this theme, Lenhard 2004)
Building Devices -Controlling Phenomena
The quotation from Landman raises two important aspects: the evidence produced by observing simulations and the impossibility of extrapolation due to what I shall call the "complexity barrier." The first aspect has been touched already in Fritz Rohrlich's contribution to PSA 1990 in which he mentioned Landman's presentation of the wire.
He pointed to the general importance of visualization for the simulation method, and particularly to the character of simulations as "dynamically anschaulich" (Rohrlich 1991 I agree with these authors that the analysis of simulation and simulation practices will bring about a series of remarkable changes, and that experimentation is definitely affected by these changes. The explorative use of simulation experiments that led to the above-mentioned surprises for Landman seems to be a particularly interesting part of simulation methodology. He was able to explore phenomena as well as the impacts of manipulations at the nanoscale. As I have said above, I argue that this approach opens up a new mode of scientific understanding. I even consider that it is obliged to do so, The last phrase of the quotation from Roukes expresses the significance of understanding: It is needed to build practical devices. I shall call the view that takes this ability as the criterion of understanding the pragmatic account of understanding. In the case of the golden nanowire, created by withdrawing a nickel tip, amazing behavior was observed in simulation experiments, and this could be validated subsequently by AFM.
However, the simulation does not offer an explanation in the usual sense. Clearly, the laws implemented in the simulation model produce the behavior. In view of the complicated process of building, encoding, and implementing models of these laws into a concrete machine, however, they form only one important factor in producing this Thus, to summarize, simulation can provide understanding in the pragmatic sense. The goal is not theory-based insight, as elaborated in the philosophical literature on scientific explanation. Rather, it is stable design rules that will be sufficient to build reliable technological artifacts.
Up to now, we have a fit between nanoscience, simulation as an instrument, and the pragmatic account of understanding. This fit, however, raises some problems:
Simulation appears to be an instrument akin to technology and prediction. But, is that not directly opposed to understanding? Control and understanding are commonly discussed as opposites. Therefore, the proposed pragmatic account of understanding deviates somewhat from common use, as the next section will show.
Epistemic Opacity and Simulation
The term "understanding" usually occurs within the context of explanation (if it occurs at all in the philosophy of science), whereas explanation is specified in the framework of a theory T: What does it mean when we say that T provides an explanation for phenomenon P? There is a lively and sophisticated debate about explanation in the philosophy of science, and it is accompanied by a great deal of literature. So, do simulations provide understanding at all? Philosophers have often complained about the growing unintelligibility that comes with computational methods even in highbrow theories. Paul Humphreys, from whom I have adopted the term "epistemic opacity," also ascribes this property to simulations and even goes on to argue that this would run counter to understanding:
This opacity can result in a loss of understanding because in most traditional static models our understanding is based upon the ability to decompose the process between model inputs and outputs into modular steps, each of which is methodologically acceptable both individually and in combination with the others. (2004, 148) Humphreys suggests that this decomposition is not possible in simulations. I would like to make two additional comments here: First, simulation modeling uses a highly modular architecture for the algorithmic model. Thus, it seems likely that the abovementioned process actually can be decomposed in a methodologically acceptable way.
However, and this is an essential addition, acceptability is judged according to the 
